Recently Bu and Wang [1] proposed a simple modulation method aiming to improve the security of chaos-based secure communications against return-map-based attacks. Soon this modulation method was independently cryptanalyzed by Chee et al. [2], Wu et al. [3], andÁlvarez et al. [4] via different attacks. As an enhancement to the Bu-Wang method, an improving scheme was suggested by Wu et al.
from the sender to the receiver, and decryption of the plain-signal is realized via chaos synchronization at the receiver end. According to the encryption structures, most analog chaos-based secure communication systems can be classified into four categories: chaotic masking [9, 10] , chaotic switching or chaotic shift keying (CSK) [11, 12] , chaotic modulation [13, 14] , and chaotic inverse system [15] . Meanwhile, some cryptanalysis work has also been developed, and many different attacks have been proposed to break different types of chaos-based secure communication systems: return-map-based attacks [16] [17] [18] , spectral analysis attacks [19, 20] , generalized-synchronizationbased attacks [21, 22] , short-time-period-based attacks [23, 24] , predictionbased attacks [25, 26] , parameter-identification-based attacks [27] [28] [29] [30] , and so on.
Since many early chaos-based secure communication systems are found insecure against various attacks, how to design robust chaos-based secure communication systems against the existing attacks is always a real challenge. The following three types of countermeasures have been proposed in the literature: 1) using more complex dynamical systems, such as hyperchaotic systems or multiple cascaded heterogeneous chaotic systems [31] ; 2) introducing traditional ciphers into chaotic cryptosystems [32] ; 3) introducing an impulsive (also named sporadic) driving signal instead of a continuous signal to realize modulation and synchronization [33] . The first countermeasure was found lately remaining insecure against some specific attacks [26, 28, 34, 35] , and some security defects of the second have also been reported [36] .
In [1] , a simple modulation method was proposed by Bu and Wang to enhance the security of some chaos-based secure communications against return-mapbased attacks. A periodic signal is used to modulate the transmitted signal in order to effectively blur the reconstructed return map. Although this modulation method can frustrate return-map-based attacks, it was soon broken independently in [2] [3] [4] with other different attacks, some of which rely on the embedded periodicity of zero-crossing points of the modulating signal. To further improve the security of the original Bu-Wang modulation method, a modified modulating signal was then suggested in [3] to cancel the embedding regular occurrence of zero-crossing points in the transmitted signal. This paper points out that the modified modulation method proposed in [3] is still insecure against a new attack that cab restore the return map. The secret parameters of the modulating signal can be approximately identified via the proposed attack. Compared with other attacks, the new attack is more powerful which can also break the original Bu-Wang modulation scheme. Furthermore, it will be pointed out that from a cryptographical point of view the modulation method itself is not so satisfactory in enhancing the security of the chaotic cryptosystems even when the modulating signal is secure enough.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Sec. 2, the modulation method and related attacks are briefly introduced. Section 3 shows how the new attack breaks the scheme based on the modified modulation method. Some general discussions on practical performance of this class of modulation-based methods under study are given in Sec. 4. The last section concludes the paper.
The modulation method and related attacks
To introduce the modulation-based method, the Lorenz system is used to construct a secure communication system. The sender system iṡ
(1) x 3 = x 1 x 2 − bx 3 and the receiver system iṡ
where σ, b, r are parameters of the system, x = (x 1 , x 2 , x 3 ) and y = (y 1 , y 2 , y 3 ) are state variables, c denotes the coupling strength, and s(x, t) = g(t)x 1 (t) is the ciphertext transmitted over the public channel for information carrying and chaos synchronization. Accordingly, s(y, t) = g(t)y 1 (t). In [1] , g(t) is selected as the product of a cosine signal and another system variable: g(t) = A cos(ωt + φ 0 )x 3 (t). When the above system runs in a chaotic masking configuration, s(x, t) = g(t)x 1 (t) + i(t), where i(t) is the plain-message signal.
In the above secure communication system, the secret key consists of the system parameters of the Lorenz system (σ, b, r) and the parameters of the modulating signal (ω, φ 0 ). Note that A should not be used as part of the key, since it does not influence the shape of the return map (just change the size). To facilitate the following discussion, without loss of generality, the parameters are fixed as the default parameters used in [1] : σ = 16, r = 45.6, b = 4.0, A = 0.5, ω = 1.5, φ 0 = 0. In the chaotic masking configuration, the plainmessage signal is assumed to be i(t) = 0.1 sin(t); in the chaotic switching configuration, the value of b switches between b 0 = 4.0 and b 1 = 4.4.
The purpose of using g(t) is to frustrate return-map-based attacks, proposed previously in [16] . In common chaotic masking systems, s(x, t) = x 1 (t) + i(t), where i(t) is the plain-message signal whose energy is much smaller than that of x 1 (t); and in common chaotic switching systems, s(x, t) = x 1 (t). Following [16] , two return maps, A n vs B n and (−C n ) vs (−D n ), are defined as follows:
, where X n and Y m are the n-th (local) maxima and the m-th (local) minima of the transmitted signal, respectively. Since the A n vs B n map is identical to the (−C n ) vs (−D n ) map, in this paper only the former will be considered. Once an attacker gets the A n vs B n return map, he can use the attack method proposed in [16] to break both the chaotic masking and the chaotic switching systems.
In Fig. 1 , some return maps reconstructed under different conditions are shown, from which it seems that the modulating function g(t) = A cos(ωt + φ 0 )x 3 (t) can effectively blur the return maps and so frustrate the attackers. However, as pointed out in [2, 3] , the modulating signal will introduce regular zero-crossing points in the transmitted signal g(t), which makes it possible to distinguish the value of ω via spectral analysis [2] or autocorrelation analysis [3] . Also, it was shown in [4] that the power spectrum of |s(x, t)| can be used to estimate the value of ω. Moreover, the value of φ 0 can be simultaneously obtained via autocorrelation analysis [3] or separately by detecting zero-crossing points at intervals equal to π 4ω [4] . A direct extraction of the binary plain-message signal from the transmitted signal has also been discussed in [4] for the chaotic switching configuration.
To resist the proposed attacks, a modified modulating signal was suggested in [3] :
It was claimed that such a simple modification can eliminate the security defect of the original scheme and can also improve the synchronization performance. The default parameters of the modified scheme are identical to the ones used in the original Bu-Wang scheme, except φ 0 = 0.3.
Breaking the scheme based on the modified modulation method
In this section, we show that the modified modulation method proposed in [3] can still be easily broken via a new attack, which is designed based on parameter estimation from the transmitted signal s(x, t). It will be shown that the proposed attack works for both chaotic masking and chaotic switching configurations. The most significant feature of the new attack is its independence of the zero-crossing points and its robustness with respect to different values of ω, φ 0 and M. This new attack is also able to break the original Bu-Wang scheme. This paper further points out that the modulation method itself is not very satisfactory from a cryptographical point of view, even if the modulating signal itself can be designed to be extremely secure against attacks.
Breaking the values of ω and φ 0
Assuming g 0 (t) = A(cos(ωt
, which means that the amplitude of |x 3 (t)x 1 (t)| is periodically modulated by g 0 (t) at a fixed frequency ω. Consequently, there exists an embedded periodicity in the amplitude of |s(x, t)|, just like the embedded periodicity in the zero-crossing points discussed in [2] [3] [4] . See Figs. 2a and b for a comparison of the waveforms of s(x, t), |s(x, t)| and g 0 (t), in the chaotic masking configuration with i(t) = 0, where the waveforms of s(x, t) and |s(x, t)| have been normalized to make the display clearer. One can see that the periodicity occurs as a clear envelop of the amplitude of |s(x, t)|. After filtering |s(x, t)| with an averaging filter, one can dramatically refine the periodicity, as shown in Fig. 2c , wherē s(x, t) = |s(x, t)| ⊛ f a (t, 4) has also been normalized for a better display and the employed averaging filter f a (t, h) is defined as follows:
Here, ⊛ denotes the convolution operation and the value of h should be chosen close to ω to get a smooth filtered signals(x, t). For this purpose, a rough estimation of ω can be easily obtained from |s(x, t)| as shown in Fig. 2b . Note that any other averaging filter may be used instead of the above triangular one.
From Fig. 2c , it is clear that one can easily get an accurate estimation of ω and φ 0 , thanks to the global phase matching betweens(x, t) and g 0 (t). Of course, some other estimation algorithms, such as the autocorrelation identification method proposed in [3] , can be employed to further improve the accuracy of the estimation. When a plain-message signal is carried in the transmitted signal s(x, t), the above estimation algorithm still works well as shown in Fig.  2d , which is attributed to the sufficiently small energy of the plain-message signal. Also, it is obvious that the above algorithm works well for the chaotic switching configuration (see Fig. 3 for a breaking result).
From the above discussion, it seems that the performance of the proposed estimation will gradually decrease as ω increases, since the averaging filter f a (t, h) may produce unsatisfactory results. This looks like a defect of the proposed attack. However, our experiments show that when ω is relatively large, it becomes possible to directly estimate the values of ω and φ 0 from |s(x, t)| only (even without using average filtering). When ω = 13.6 1 , for example, the waveforms of |s(x, t)|,s(x, t) and g 0 (t) are shown in Fig. 4 , where the parameter of the averaging filter is chosen as h = 0.2. Note that the positions of local minima of |s(x, t)| coincide very well with those of g 0 (t), althoughs(x, t) becomes less clear. This demonstrates that the proposed attack method is rather robust to different values of ω and φ 0 .
It is worth mentioning that the value of ω can also be derived via spectral analysis: simply, calculating the power spectrum ofs(x, t) and extracting the spectrum peak at the frequency ω. In fact, such a direct spectral analysis for estimating ω works even without using average filtering, as shown in [4] . This is because the following property of Lorenz-like chaotic systems [24, 37] : although x 1 (t) of the Lorenz system has a wideband spectrum as shown in Fig. 5a , the absolute-valued signal |x 1 (t)| has a prominent spectrum peak at an inherent frequency f z , which is uniquely determined by the system parameters σ, b and r and is independent of the initial conditions. See Fig. 5b for the power spectrum of |x 1 (t)|. This is also true for x 2 (t). For x 3 (t), the operation is even simpler: x 3 (t) itself has a prominent spectrum peak at the inherent frequency f z . This implies that |s(x, t)| = g 0 (t)|x 3 (t)x 1 (t)| will have at least two prominent spectrum peaks, at f z and f ω = ω 2π (Hz), respectively. See Figs.
5c and d for a comparison of the power spectra of s(x, t) and |s(x, t)|. It can be seen that the first prominent peak is at the frequency f ω and the second at f z . Apparently, ω can also be obtained from f ω as ω = 2πf ω . Following [24, 37] , such an inherent frequency also exists in Chua and Rössler systems, so the same spectral analysis is also available for attacking these two chaotic systems widely-used in chaos-based secure communications. At present, it is not clear whether there exists any chaotic system that has no distinguishable inherent 
frequency.
Compared with the spatial attack proposed above, the existing spectral attack has some defects: 1) it cannot work well when ω ≈ f z ; 2) the value of φ 0 cannot be simultaneously estimated with ω in the frequency domain; 3) if there does not exist a strong DC component in |x 3 (t)x 1 (t)| (e.g., if some other chaotic systems are also used), f ω will not occur as a prominent peak in the power spectrum 2 ; 4) when other chaotic systems are used instead of the Lorenz system, the inherent frequency may not exist (though unlikely) or the frequency f ω might not be easily identified from the power spectra. scheme, where the condition is somewhat different since g 0 (t) = A cos(ωt+ φ 0 ) is not always positive. In that case, one has |s(x, t)| = A| cos(ωt
Finally, let us see how the proposed attack works on the original Bu-Wang
Thus, with the above-described attack we will get 2ω and 2φ 0 , which can be easily halved to obtain the values of ω and φ 0 . In Fig. 6 , the result of breaking the chaotic masking configuration with i(t) = 0 of the original Bu-Wang scheme is shown, where a different averaging filter, f ′ a (t, 1), is used to makes(x, t) smoother:
From the above analysis, one can see that the attack proposed in this subsection can work for not only the original Bu-Wang scheme but also some other scheme if the modulating signal g 0 (t) is periodic (which need not be a simple sinusoidal or cosine signal). Therefore, an aperiodic or even chaotic modulating signal g 0 (t) has to be used to enhance the security. However, in this case the synchronization of the modulating signal itself becomes a new problem, which will be further discussed in Sec. 4.2.
Breaking the value of M
Once the values of ω and φ 0 are known, one can further break the value of M via an iterative process, and then get rid of the blurring effect on the return map by removing g 0 (t) from s(x, t). To do so, define an auxiliary signal
where M ′ is an estimation of M. Apparently, it is expected that the closer the value of M ′ is to M, the closer the signalŝ(x, t) is tox 13 (t) = Ax 3 (t)x 1 (t). As a natural result, if M ′ changes from a value larger than M to a value smaller than M, i.e., (M ′ > M) → (M ′ < M), the behavior ofŝ(x, t) will gradually go closer tox 13 (t) and then turn gradually far away fromx 13 (t) once M ′ crosses the point M ′ = M. Therefore, there exists a global minimum at the point M ′ = M. The existence of such a global minimum can be easily checked by observing the reconstructed return map fromŝ(x, t) or |ŝ(x, t)|. In Fig. 7 , the return maps constructed from |ŝ(x, t)| with respect to different values of M ′ are shown. The reason why |ŝ(x, t)| is used is that this reconstructed return map has a simpler structure than the map reconstructed fromŝ(x, t). The following features can be found from the maps:
(1) The closer the value of M ′ is to M, the thinner the branch width and the closer the return map reconstructed from |ŝ(x, t)| is to the return map from |x 13 (t)|. edges of the right-bottom branch can be quantitatively defined by different methods. For example, some algorithms can be used to extract the skeleton and the two edges of the branch, and then determine the two measures. In fact, in real attacks, an attacker can directly get a rough estimation of the measures by naked eye, and then manually carry out the following iterative algorithm for several times to find a sufficiently accurate estimation of M. 
Apparently, the above iterative algorithm is rather similar to the numerical algorithms for solving algebraic equations for roots [38] . It can be easily deduced that the estimation accuracy after m rounds is M − M ≤ M + −M − 2n m . To achieve a predefined accuracy ǫ > 0, it is required that M + −M − , which is sufficiently small for an attacker to carry out the algorithm manually. When n = 3, the computing complexity is minimized, since the integer function f (n) = n log 2 n (n ≥ 2) reaches the global minimum at n = 3.
Although in theory the above algorithm can get an arbitrarily accurate estimation by increasing the round number m, the distinguishability of the return map reconstructed from a finite set of data will be insufficient when M ′ is too close to M. Fortunately, in this case, the return map will be sufficiently clear for an intruder to carry out the return-map-based attacks. Figure 8 shows the return map reconstructed from |ŝ(x, t)| andŝ(x, t) when M ′ = M + 0.01 in the chaotic switching configuration. It can be seen that such an accuracy is enough to break the 0/1-bits in the plain-message signal.
4 Discussions on the performance of the modulation-based methods
A cryptographical perspective
From a cryptographical point of view, a modulating signal is not an effective tool for enhancing the security of chaos-based secure communications, due to the dependence of the secret parameters of the chaotic systems on the secret parameters of the modulating signal. In fact, to break the whole chaotic cryptosystem via a brute-force attack, what an attacker should do is to exhaustively guess the secret parameters of the modulating signal, not all secret parameters (system parameters and modulating parameters). This means that the key space of the whole system is reduced to be max(K m , K c ), i.e., to be K m when K m > K c , where K m is the key space of the modulating signal and K c is the key space of the chaotic cryptosystem without modulation. However, for a good encryption algorithm, the key space should be always K m ×K c [39] .
To further enhance the modulation-based method, the modulating operation should be non-invertible, i.e., expressing s(x, t) = F (g 0 (t), x), the function F (·, ·) should be non-invertible with respect to x. However, with such a complicated modulating mechanism, the synchronization between the sender and the receiver may become much more difficult and be impossible under practical conditions (see the next subsection for further discussion on synchronization issues).
The synchronization performance
In [3] , it was found that "almost no value can achieve the synchronization when M = 0", i.e., when the original Bu-Wang scheme [1] is used. Our experiments support this claim. Furthermore, when g 0 (t) = A cos(ωt + φ 0 ), Matlab's numerical differentiation function, ode45 used in this work, fails (i.e., enters into a dead lock) with a high probability for many values of c. This implies that the original synchronization scheme proposed in [1] is ill-behaved in most cases.
It can be confirmed that chaos synchronization of the modified scheme suggested in [3] can be achieved for a large range of values of c. This means that the modification in [3] really enhances the synchronization performance. For verification, a number of experiments were carried out to study the synchronization performance when g 0 (t) is replaced by some other functions. As a surprising result, it was found that even a non-negative noise signal can make the receiver system synchronized well with the sender system. Figure Fig. 9 . The synchronization errors of the three system variables when g 0 (t) = rand(t) ∈ (0, 1): |y 1 (t) − x 1 (t)|, |y 2 (t) − x 2 (t)| and |y 3 (t) − x 3 (t)| (from top to bottom). 9 shows the experimental result when g 0 (t) = rand(t) ∈ (0, 1) and c = 10.
Some other signals were also tested, for example, g 0 (t) = t 2 mod 1 and g 0 (t) = (t cos(ωt+φ 0 )) mod 1, and it was found that chaos synchronization is achieved in both cases. At present, the reason behind this unexpected synchronization phenomenon is still not clear.
Conclusion
In [1] , a simple modulation-based method was proposed to improve the security of chaos-based secure communications against return-map-based attacks. Soon this scheme was independently cryptanalyzed in [2] [3] [4] via different attacks. Then, in [3] , a modified modulation-based scheme was proposed to enhance the security of the original one. This paper proposes a new attack to break the new modified scheme. Compared with previous attacks, the proposed attack is more powerful and can also break the original scheme in [1] . Based on all analysis and experimental results, the conclusion is that, from a cryptographical point of view, the security of this class of modulation-based scheme is not satisfactory for secure communications.
